

## **Chapter 4**

# **DETERRENCE AND CONFLICT: THE DYNAMICS OF STRATEGIC ARMS RACE IN SOUTHERN ASIA**

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## **ABSTRACT**

The paper argues that deterrence stability in Southern Asia is threatened by the sub-conventional warfare and aggressive nuclear posture adopted by Pakistan. Pakistan, owing to its revisionist territorial ambitions, is focused on two contradictory strategic goals in Southern Asia: Deterrence and Territorial Revisionism. This contradiction in strategy is further complicated by its policy of seeking parity with India while ensuring deterrence against India's superior conventional forces. To seek parity, it is investing heavily in its conventional and nuclear forces and funding a low intensity conflict in Kashmir. This is a major cause of instability that may escalate if India chooses to respond decisively against militant infrastructure inside Pakistan. Both of these factors are directly weakening the prospect of deterrence stability in Southern Asia. The paper also looks at the structural causes of instability in the region where China, India, and Pakistan are entangled in a conflict spiral.

**Keywords:** South Asia, arms race, deterrence and conflict, confidence and security building measures

## **INTRODUCTION**

The initial development of nuclear infrastructure in Pakistan was not explicitly focused on the development of nuclear weapons. General Ayub Khan, the President of Pakistan from 1958-1969, was extremely reluctant to authorize the development of nuclear weapons.

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