THEORY AND PRAXIS

REFLECTIONS ON THE COLONIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE

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13 Education and the formation of the multitude

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Introduction

The educational system within the liberal democratic setup of the nation state continues to focus on making good citizens out of the swarm of children who enter the schools at the tender age of five or six. The thrust of education is to make children knowledgeable so that they become "rational enough" to oblige the law of the land and a "civic sense" arises in them. William Galston writes, "all education is civic education in the sense that individuals' level of general educational attainment significantly affects their level of political knowledge as well as the quantity and character of their political participation".[1] There is no gainsaying the fact that formal educational mechanisms play a major role in making citizens which constitute "a people" out of children.

Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, through their book *Empire*, conveyed that the globalized world has already moved beyond the point where one can think that the notion of "people" can play a revolutionary role in bringing a socio-political change in a society. Instead, they argue that the world today is governed by a de-territorial and de-centralized apparatus of rule which is global. They call it "Empire". Comprising a series of various supranational and globally woven institutions, Empire today is the new exploitative mechanism to oppress, dominate and coerce the masses. The liberal nation-state itself is in a state of crisis, and its sovereignty has shifted to this de-territorial Empire. The notion of people was considered revolutionary and active only within the contours of the nation state, and when the nation state is in crisis, it cannot play a radical revolutionary role which it played in the terrain of modernity – in the French Revolution, anti-colonization struggles and so on. To resist and revolt against the exploitative Empire, Negri and Hardt instead propose a new form of political subjectivity which they call "multitude". It is only the creative forces of "multitude" which can take us through and beyond Empire, argue Hardt and Negri.[2]

This chapter is an attempt to elucidate the role education can play in forming "multitude" rather than a people from the students. The first section of this chapter offers a brief sketch of Empire and its global-imperial

structure. It will try to delineate how Negri and Hardt look at the possibility of "multitude" in overthrowing the exploitative and repressive regime of Empire. The second section will, while offering a political historiography of the concept of people through modernity, try to look into various differences between the notion of "people" and the notion of "multitude". The third section will try to show how educational institutions work as factories which aim to produce "a people" by suppressing the immanent differences present within the students based on a Foucauldian analysis of educational institution as a "disciplinary block". The fourth and concluding section of this chapter locates critical pedagogy as the philosophy of education which can, while assisting the students in concentrating on real and contemporary issues, help educational institutions carve multitude out of the students.

The Empire

While formulating the concept of Empire, both Negri and Hardt attempt to present a critical history of the present and a vision for the future. They theorize about the contemporary forms of politics and sovereignty through the concept of Empire and attempt to hope for a normative global vision of absolute (global) democracy through a yet-to-be realized emergent political subjectivity which they call "multitude".

Negri and Hardt argue that the crisis of modernity which led to the overthrow of modern colonial and imperialist regimes paved the way for an "irresistible and irreversible globalization of economic and cultural exchanges".[3] The irresistible and easy exchange has given rise to new form of global order and a new form of sovereignty which they call Empire. Negri and Hardt argue that this globalization of capitalist exchanges, while making the economic relations between nation-states more easy and fluid, has resulted in decline of sovereignty of nation-states. The modernist understanding of sovereignty as theorized by political philosophers from Jean Bodin to Hobbes to Schmitt has taken a new form. The locus of sovereignty has shifted from nation-state to a new global order which now governs the world. It is important to note here that not only has sovereignty taken a new form, but in the process, the nature of sovereignty itself has changed. The modernist concept of sovereignty which was based on the dialectic tension of inside and outside, on the notion of a nation-state and its "outer", has now shifted to what they call an imperial sovereignty. Imperial sovereignty in contrast to the modernist imperialist understanding of sovereignty, operates on a global framework, making the boundaries of nation-states less effective. As Hardt says, "[w]e claim that there has been a shift from the modern form of sovereignty . . . to what we call imperial sovereignty. The form of modern sovereignty can be characterized schematically by the dialectic of inside and outside. . . . Imperial sovereignty, in contrast, operates on a network model and functions through hybrid identities and differences of degree".[4] The

network model of this imperial sovereignty comprises various national and supra-national institutions like the World Bank, IMF, international NGOs and so on which function as "the symbology of the imperial order".[5]

The sovereignty of nation-states, they argue, was the cornerstone of modernist understanding of imperialism and colonialism, which, following the distinction of inside and outside, was an "extension of the sovereignty of European nation-states beyond their own boundaries".[6] It is through the modernist understanding of sovereignty that the European powers maintained in Europe the centre of their empires, while the provinces remained at the periphery. The passage of modernist sovereignty to imperial sovereignty has made boundaries and territories irrelevant. Instead, Empire "is a de-centered and de-territorializing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open expanding frontiers".[7] The Empire within its network and non-place (as it is both nowhere and everywhere due to its de-territorial character) exerts enormous powers of oppression and exploitation. It rules the world through hybrid identities and communicative networks, which are at their core imperial, oppressive and exploitative.

Negri and Hardt argue that an alternative to the oppressive forces of Empire is possible only through resisting these forces on the imperial terrain of Empire itself. Since Empire does not rely on the modernist understanding of inside and outside but in turn rules through networking and managing hybrid identities, it can be rebuffed by redirecting and reorganizing its imperial processes of global exchanges towards new ends. The global and decentred presence of Empire has left no way to resist it from outside or from some independent political space. To resist the smooth space of decentred and de-territorial Empire, a new form of resistance has to be conceived which, while using the ontological conditions Empire presents, takes us through and beyond it. As they write:

> The decline of any political sphere signals the decline, too, of any independent space where revolution could emerge in the national political regime, or where social space can be transformed using the instruments of the state. The traditional idea of counter-power and the idea of resistance against modern sovereignty in general thus becomes less and less possible. . . . A new type of resistance would have to be found that would be adequate to the new dimensions of sovereignty.[8]

Using the possibilities of the non-place of Empire and going past its limitations, the forces of "multitude" (a new form of political subjectivity) have to form a "Counter-Empire" of exchanges and resistive subjectivity within the non-place of Empire itself. In this way only can we think of a postmodern republicanism or a global communism based on the ideal of absolute democracy. By multitude, Negri and Hardt mean the emergent political subjectivity which will resist and throw away Empire. It is different from both

the notion of people which is a single identity and masses whose essence is indifference and passivity.[9] Multitude, on the other hand, is a multiplicity of singularities while discovering their commonality in the form of activity and a constructive proposal.[10] As Negri and Hardt write, "[t]he multitude is not formed simply by throwing together and mixing nations and people indifferently; it is the singular power of a *new city*".[11]

"People" and "Multitude"

The choice between the concept of "people" and the concept of "multitude" has been at the heart of modernity. Modernity itself is not unitary but characterized by struggle and crisis between these two concepts. The controversy between the two modes of modernities – the revolutionary and the counter-revolutionary one – was a controversy based on these two concepts. It was all "multitude" versus "people". "These two competing concepts, forged in the fires of intense clashes, played a primary role in the definition of the political-social categories of the modern era. It was the notion of "people" which prevailed. "Multitude" is the losing term, the concept which got the worst of it".[12]

Original modernity – the first mode of modernity, as Negri and Hardt call it – was a modernity characterized by revolutionary multitude which emphasized the immanence of both knowledge and power in opposition to the medieval notions of transcendence. For them, it was the surging up of the "multitude" as the immanent locus of both power and knowledge, be it at the level of religion, politics or epistemology. This discovery of plane of immanence at level of multitude affirms the singularity of being – a being who affirms the powers of this world, a being which is a being full of potentiality and reason.[13] "The plane of immanence is the one on which the powers of singularity are realized and the one on which the truth of the new humanity is determined historically, technically and politically. For this very fact, because there cannot be any external mediation, the singular is presented as a multitude".[14]

However, the revolutionary beginnings of modernity – a radical revolutionary potential which overturned the old metaphysics – soon incited a strong antagonism. The revolution of modernity, as Negri says, determined a counterrevolution which, without attempting to go back to pre-modern logic of thinking, "sought to dominate and expropriate the force of the emerging movements and . . . establish an overarching power to dominate them".[15] This counterrevolutionary mode of modernity is what Negri and Hardt call the second mode of modernity. Aiming to neutralize the constituent and immanent forces of a revolutionary multitude, it attempted to deploy a transcendent mechanism of control and authority. A second storm followed the first one which attempted to reproduce the traditional dualistic, medieval and religious consciousness in an innovative and novel manner. It aimed to restore peace, a peace which, according to Negri and Hardt, is

nothing more than a "miserable and humiliating peace" – a peace "that in a short stretch of time had lost the humanist".[16] To bring this "peace", political theorists (especially Hobbes) looked for a transcendent mechanism of rule that aims to bring order and peace while doing away with the medieval forms of transcendence. The whole aim was to introduce a modernist statecraft which maintains and takes care of the effects of domination typical of its medieval predecessors. Hobbes argued for an "ultimate and absolute sovereign ruler, a 'God on earth' ".[17] The theorization of a state of nature which is a state of conflict and war – a limitless right of everybody over everything, as Agamben calls it[18] – among all individuals and the necessity of a Leviathan to guarantee the protection of life is nothing but to hand over the right to act to the sovereign power that stands above and rules it. The single and diverse wills of all the individuals converge through the contract and are now represented in the single will of the transcendent sovereign. The civilization of nature through contract is aimed to make "a people" who are a unity and homogeneity from a "multitude" who are a heterogeneity and multiplicity. For Hobbes, multitude is inherent in state of nature, and it is only people who inherit the state. People represent order, while multitude represents disorder and rebellion. As Paulo Virno writes:

> The concept of people, according to Hobbes, is strictly correlated to the existence of the State; furthermore, it is a reverberation, a reflection of the State: if there is a State, then there are people. In the absence of the State, there are no people. In the *De Cive*, in which the horror of the multitude is exposed far and wide, we read: "The People is somewhat that is one, having one will, and to whom one action may be attributed" (Hobbes, *De Cive*, Chap. XII, section VIII). The multitude, for Hobbes, is inherent in the "state of nature;" therefore, it is inherent in that which precedes the "body politic".[19]

A people is a notion which asserts (or at least tends to assert) homogeneity, identity, oneness, while a multitude is a heterogeneity, multiplicity and plane of immanent singularities and autonomous potentialities. The multitude is an immanent constituent relation, while the people is a "constituted synthesis" prepared to serve the interests of sovereignty. The authors of *Empire* argue that Hobbes had taken the difference between multitude and people into account when he proposed the view of absolute sovereignty. Hobbes, they say, had stated that "a people" depicts oneness both in will and action, while multitude is devoid of any such attribute. A state should make the "multitude" into "a people". As they write:

> The people is one. The population, of course, is composed of numerous different individuals and classes, but the people synthesizes or reduces these social differences into one identity. The multitude, by contrast, is not unified but remains plural and multiple. This is why, according to

> the dominant tradition of political philosophy, the people can rule as a sovereign power and the multitude cannot.[20]

The multitude is composed of a set of singularities where singularity is a social subject whose difference cannot be in any way reduced to the sameness (as in people). The concept of multitude seeks to project a coherent collectivity while at the same time retaining the subjectivity and singularity of the individual. It is both multiplicity and collectivity at the same time. The emphasis on multiplicity should not, however, make one think that it is anarchical, jumbled or incoherent (as Hobbes had taken it to be). Rather, multitude is a coherent collective constituted by multiple active social subjects "whose constitution and action is not based on identity or unity (or, much less, indifference) but on what it has in common".[21] The common is not any sort of identity or similarity reached at an abstract level but the activity which enhances the productivity of singularities. Negri writes that "common is not difference per se; it is rather, activity, that is the activity that builds this thing, that thing, anything. In short, it is *alma venus*".[22]

The conception of multitude goes against the established view of modern political philosophy, which argues about ruling the homogeneity and ordered. While Hobbes theorized that it is only people who inherit a state and can be a sovereign, multitude punctures this notion at its very foundation. Emphasizing multiplicity and inherent subjectivities and singularities, multitude offers a terrain on which it aspires to act in common and rule itself. "Rather than a political body with one that commands and others that obey, the multitude is *living flesh* that rules itself".[23] One can say that multitude brings back the humanist revolution of the first mode of modernity as it emphasizes the immanence of differences and potentialities. It aspires to end the established mechanisms of modern political philosophy as well as the postmodern Empire by looking beyond imposed exploitation towards a freedom – a freedom that is "prior to and incompatible with the bourgeois idealist conception of freedom".[24]

The "good ideal citizen"

This notion of "a people" which is so fundamental to modern politics and its bogies of nation state has to be cultivated in an instituted form. "A People" consisting of citizens who confirm to the power relations of the nation-state needs to manufactured. It is the educational institutions which play a major role. They work as factories producing and manufacturing people to cater to the politico-social structures of state. Foucault argues that among other institutions (like prison, asylum etc.), schools function as disciplinary institutions which are aimed to discipline the student for a particular end. Schools, through discipline, produce subjects which the absolute sovereign power wants. In other words, they produce "a people". Schools construct subjects, or more aptly student subjects, who are a product of

multiple discourses oscillating between school and state, family and classroom, society and school and so on. The subject produced is thus no more an autonomous universal individual but a construct of discourses which govern the disciplinary functions of the school. The subject produced is a constructed and contested subject. An important characteristic of this subject, for Foucault, is that it has an ambiguous meaning. It is both "subject to" and "subject of". It is in this ambiguity that Foucault finds school a prevalent apparatus of the power which:

> applies itself to immediate everyday life which categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize and which others have to recognize in him. It is a form of power which makes individuals subjects. There are two meanings of the word "subject": subject to someone else by control and dependence; and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self knowledge.[25]

Yoko Oka argues that Foucault's discussions on education clearly show that educational systems aim to produce "good ideal citizens" by routing their conduct and thought. They make people submit to the requirements of the state without being aware of the logic that justifies disciplinary technologies of a school. While changing the notion of an autonomous universal subject to a constructed subject, the educational system makes what Foucault calls "docile bodies" out of individual and autonomous bodies. He writes, "Foucault proposed that the education system enable the creation of individuals who do not ask questions about what they should or should not do. Even their bodies react automatically. Foucault calls this 'docile bodies.' To use individuals efficiently in a state, docile bodies are a prerequisite, since in forming any useful act for the authority, nothing should be useless".[26]

The disciplined individuals, while constituting "good ideal citizens", automatically acquit the state of dealing with any subversive elements, for the educational setup is functioning under the vein of discourses which aim at homogenization. The individuals no more remain autonomous and free but become (read: are made into) useful individuals who serve the interests of power and state. The immanent differences of children who join the educational institutions are broken and moulded into homogeneity – homogeneity which the state needs and on which it rests. Oka gives ample examples of the educational system in Japan to show how it attempts to homogenize students to sustain the idea of nationalism. He argues that the Japanese education system is constructed for nurturing the idea of nation and nationalism. As he writes, "Bryan McVeigh analyzed Japanese education as 'constructed' to take a part in building Japanese nationalism: 'National states routinely encourage stateness and nation-ness via organizing, systematizing, and monitoring schooling operations'. McVeigh argued strongly that Japanese

education problems are not pedagogical, but 'political.'"[27] Nationalism contains the notion of "people" as its originary cell. And when the originary of "people", that is, a citizen, is a "good ideal citizen" who is constructed in the manufactories of educational setup, the whole of "people" becomes a homogeneity which serves the state and sustains it. From nation to people and from people to citizen, all concepts aim at homogenization.

Critical pedagogy

The previous discussions about Empire, its new global-imperial structure and the archaic educational mechanisms of disciplining students to become "people" suggest that while the globalized world has changed the nature of forms of power and exploitation, education still remains tied to requirements of national sovereignty – manufacturing nationalists and good ideal citizens to form "people". I suggest that a new philosophy of education based entirely on Paulo Freire's critical pedagogy can play a crucial role in bridging this imbalance. One can even go to the extent of saying that critical pedagogy, through its unique "problem-centric" educational focus, can help educate for a "multitude" rather than "people".

Critical pedagogy is an educational philosophy which aims to foster the development of critical consciousness (*conscienticizao*, as Paulo Freire calls it) among students by making them recognize the system of oppressive power relations and their effect(s) on the society. It aims to integrate this critical consciousness with a transformative rationality so that a liberatory praxis for emancipation can be initiated. "Not only is the critical person adept at recognizing injustice but, for critical pedagogy, that person is also moved to change it".[28] Henry Giroux, one of the apt followers of Freire, defines critical pedagogy as "the educational movement, guided by passion and principle, to help students develop consciousness of freedom, recognize authoritarian tendencies, and connect knowledge to power and the ability to take constructive action".[29]

Freire argues that the prominent system of education works like a "banking model" which treats students as "receivers" where the narratives vomited by teachers are deposited. For Freire, thus, students (in the banking model) appear as Locke's *tabula rasa* which are filled through the accounts of teachers and where the teacher regulates what should enter and what should not enter into the student's mind. This narrative character of education distorts concrete realities and removes the dynamics from them. It makes concrete realities look static. The politics behind devising such curriculum and teaching practices is to give a passive role to the student by turning him into an object that has to be filled by the "erudite" sermons of teachers. The main aim is to curtail any sort of creative and subversive tendency in the students so that they adapt to the oppressive and dominating tendencies of world *per se*. Adapting to the prevalent situation without

letting students develop critical consciousness makes it easy to dominate and subjugate them. Freire writes:

> It is not surprising that the banking concept of education regards men as adaptable, manageable beings. The more students work at storing the deposits entrusted to them, the less they develop the critical consciousness which would result from their intervention in the world as transformers of that world. The more completely they accept the passive role imposed on them, the more they tend simply to adapt to the world as it is and to the fragmented view of reality deposited in them.[30]

Freire, instead of a narrativist teacher, proposes the concept of a "humanist revolutionary educator" who engages students in a mutual process of critical learning which is connected with concrete realities and transformative possibilities. He argues that focusing on the communication between the student and the teacher and treating the relationship as mutual (where the role of teacher and students coexists in both) can help make students critical and inquisitive about the world they live in. This, according to him, can be done by making education a problem-posing education. " 'Problem-posing' education, responding to the essence of consciousness – *intentionality* – rejects communiqués and embodies communication".[31] Problem-posing education, while replacing the banking concept of education, puts problems regarding human beings not in a static and unilateral way (like the banking model) but in their relation to the society and larger world. It treats reality not as static but as a process which needs to be understood by making it bare. It attempts to engage students in critical questioning regarding the oppressive present by making them relate to it through histories, social relations and bare concrete realities. It also makes students locate themselves in this present by looking forward for a concrete liberatory action. As Giroux writes:

> Central to such a pedagogy is shifting the emphasis from teachers to students and making visible the relationships among knowledge, authority, and power. Giving students the opportunity to be problem posers and to engage in a culture of questioning puts in the foreground the crucial issues of who has control over the conditions of learning and how specific modes of knowledge, identity, and authority are constructed within particular classroom relations. Under such circumstances, knowledge is not simply received by students, but actively transformed, as they learn how to engage others in critical dialogue and be held accountable for their own views.[32]

The prevalent educational mechanisms which discipline students to become good citizens (as discussed in the previous section) rather than critically conscious subjectivities and singularities are then following

Freire's position of a "banking model of education". They aspire to make students more adaptable to the dominations of power and exploitation by repressing the creative and subversive tendencies against oppressive regimes of power and exploitation. Even under the global order of Empire, educational systems work like "banking models" which produce "productive citizens" that can be controlled and dominated by the supranational skeleton of Empire. The major multinational corporations, World Bank, international NGOs and so on fund educational institutions round the globe only to control educational policies and pedagogic practices. The imperial machine of Empire employs various "standard tests" to calculate the IQ, adaptability, personality traits and so on of students round the world so that their productive capacity vis-à-vis the interests of Empire can be predicted and mapped. Education is under the direct control of Empire – by the Empire, of the Empire and for the Empire. Steven Page writes:

> The World Bank is only interested in education that supports a knowledge economy, which is what trans-national corporations desire. Trans-national corporations are able to control education because they promote themselves as the future employers of the students. With this amount of control international institutions can ensure that educational systems around the world do not produce students who will question the power of Empire.[33]

Such educational practices merely produce a "global people" who follow Empire without knowing about its exploitative traps. If the resistive and critical-minded political subjectivity of multitude is to be generated, then Freire's problem-posing model of education seems a viable alternative. By giving students rather than educational institutions and teachers the central role to choose and decide the curriculum and subjects of debate, such a model can help in fostering multitude. I propose that students should have a decisive voice in choosing syllabi and topics they need to study. It is only this decisive voice which can help students bring the issues of current political and social scenario to the centre of discussion. They will, while using their free will, choose to debate the concrete world in which they live and try to locate themselves in it. The concrete world is, needless to say, the world of Empire: a world full of exploitative mechanisms, and learning about them can definitely foster Freire's transformative rationality and begin moving the way forward towards realizing multitude. The main difference between Freire's model and this one is that here the students have to be both students and the "humanist revolutionary educators" of themselves. This, I guess, is a strength rather than a weakness. Steven Page hopes, "[I]f classrooms around the world would devote a month to student-led content we could have a great foundation for the multitude".[34]

Notes

1 William A. Galston, 'Political Knowledge, Political Engagement and Civic Education', *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 45 (2001), p. 219.
2 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), p. xv.
3 Ibid., xi.
4 Paul A. Passavant and Jodi Dean (eds.), *Empire's New Clothes* (New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 167.
5 Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, 31.
6 Ibid., p. xii.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., pp. 307–308.
9 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire* (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), pp. xiii, xiv.
10 Antonio Negri and Cesare Casarino, *In Praise of the Common: A Conversation on Philosophy and Politics* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), pp. 65–98.
11 Hardt and Negri, *Empire,* p. 395 (emphasis in the original).
12 Paulo Virno, *A Grammar of the Multitude: For an Analysis of Contemporary Forms of Life*, trans. Isabella Bertoletti, James Cascaito and Andrea Casson (Los Angeles and New York: Semiotexte, 2004), p. 21.
13 Hardt and Negri, *Empire,* p. 71.
14 Ibid., p. 73.
15 Ibid., p. 74.
16 Ibid., p. 75.
17 Ibid., p. 83.
18 Giorgio Agamben, *Means Without End: Notes on Politics,* trans. Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 2000), p. 5.
19 Virno, *A Grammar of The Multitude: For an Analysis of Contemporary Forms of Life*, p. 22.
20 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004), p. 99. Though Negri and Hardt present the notion of people as a unitary and homogenous entity by drawing from Hobbes and giving their own distinctions, Agamben has a different and opposite take. In his essay 'What Is a People', Agamben states that the term "people" only tends to be unitary and homogenous. In fact, the term is inherently full of exclusions and heterogeneity. The function of the concept of people in Western politics has been ambiguous, which is not accidental but a construction itself. He writes, "It is as if in other words, what we call people was actually not a unitary subject but rather a dialectical oscillation between two opposite poles: . . . on the one hand, an inclusive concept that pretends to be without remainder while, on the other hand, an exclusive concept known to afford no hope". For details see Agamben, *Means Without End: Notes on Politics*.
21 Hardt and Negri, *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire*, p. 100.
22 Negri and Casarino, *In Praise of the Common: A Conversation on Philosophy and Politics*, p. 83.
23 Hardt and Negri, *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire*, p. 100.
24 Negri and Casarino, *In Praise of the Common: A Conversation on Philosophy and Politics*, p. 85.
25 Michel Foucault, 'The Subject and Power', *Critical Inquiry*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1982), p. 781.

26 Yoko Oka, *Taming Japan's Democracy: The Making of Homogenous Japanese Citizens Through Education* (M.A. diss., University of Victoria, 2012), p. 22.
27 Ibid., p. 29.
28 'Critical Thinking and Critical Pedagogy: Relations, Differences, and Limits', http://faculty.education.illinois.edu/burbules/papers/critical.html, last accessed 23 May 2013. The web article is also published in *Critical Theories in Education*, ed. Thomas S. Popkewitz and Lynn Fendler (New York: Routledge, 1999).
29 Henry A. Giroux, 'Lessons from Paulo Freire', *Chronicle of Higher Education*, Vol. 57, No. 9 (October 22, 2010).
30 Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, trans. Myra Bergman Ramos (New York: Continuum, 2005), p. 73.
31 Ibid., p. 79 (Emphasis in the original.)
32 Giroux, 'Lessons from Paulo Freire'.
33 C. Steven Page, 'Creating Nomads: The Importance of Education in Forming the Multitude' (PhD. diss., Georgia Southern University, 2007), p. 154.
34 Ibid., p. 156.